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Introduction 
 
There is now considerable evidence indicating that many people are not only interested in 
their own material payoffs but that they are motivated by “social” concerns as well 
(Camerer 2003). Experimental and field evidence suggest that the existence of people 
exhibiting social preferences may have a profound impact on incentive provision, contract 
formation, organizations, and markets (Fehr and Schmidt 2003a). A major puzzle in the 
literature on social preferences concerns the fact that a large majority of subjects behaves 
as if completely self-interested in some circumstances, such as in competitive experimental 
markets with standardized goods or in the final rounds of public goods experiments, while 
social concerns seem to motivate a large majority of subjects in other circumstances, e.g. in 
competitive markets with incomplete contracts or in public goods experiments with 
punishment opportunities. Recently developed models of inequity aversion (Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999) assume the existence of a heterogeneous 
population of selfish and inequity averse subjects, thus providing an explanation for these 
puzzling facts. Engelmann and Strobel (2004, henceforth E&S) question the relevance of 
inequity aversion in simple dictator game experiments in a recent paper1, claiming that a 
combination of a preference for efficiency2 and a Rawlsian3 motive for helping the least 
well-off is more important than inequity aversion.  
In this paper, we show that Engelmann and Strobel overstate the relevance of 
efficiency motives. The participants of the E&S experiments were undergraduate students 
of economics and business administration. These subjects self-selected into their field of 
study (economics) and learned early in their studies that efficiency is something desirable. 
Non-economists, however, may value efficiency much less than economists do. We 
replicated the most relevant experiments E&S conducted with various subject pools and 
                                                 
1 A dictator game is a non-strategic game in which only one subject (the dictator) makes a decision that 
affects the payoffs of several people. In the E&S experiments, the dictator decides on the material payoff two 
other subjects receive, while the dictator’s own monetary payoff is constant or varies little. E&S refer to this 
special class of dictator games as “simple distribution games”. 
2 "Efficiency" in Engelmann and Strobl (2004) is not defined as Pareto-efficiency but as surplus 
maximization. Thus, any subject motivated by efficiency concerns values the total monetary payoff for the 
group positively in the subject's utility function. We stick to this use of the term efficiency to prevent 
confusion.  
3 Rawls (1973) argues that if people had to decide about the allocation of all resources and opportunities in 
society without any knowledge about what their own role in this society is going to be (i.e. behind a “veil of 
ignorance”) they would unanimously agree on an allocation scheme that maximizes the well being of the 
least well off, in particular when it comes to the allocation of “basic goods” such as education, health care, 
etc. In the following we will call the desire to maximize the payoff of the poorest people “Rawlsian” or 
“maximin” preferences.  
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are able to show that the dominance of the efficiency motive over the equity motive is 
restricted to students of economics and business administration. Students from various 
other disciplines, adult academics, and a sample of non-academic employees value equality 
much more highly than efficiency.  
This raises the question whether there are other subject characteristics such as gender 
or the political attitudes that affect the preferences for efficiency versus equality. We find a 
non-negligible gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. 
However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to 
political attitudes, i.e., subjects who vote for right wing parties and favor right wing 
political attitudes are as likely to favor the equality motive as are subjects with left wing 
attitudes.  
The strong subject pool effects show that the efficiency motive in non-strategic 
dictator games is far less important than E&S suggest. The question remains whether 
efficiency concerns are important in strategic games. In the final part of the paper we 
mention evidence suggesting that the efficiency motive plays no significant role in 
strategic games.  
 
I. Economists versus Non-Economists  
 
The most interesting results of E&S concern their treatments Ey and P that are designed to 
discriminate between preferences for efficiency, the Rawlsian maximin motive, and 
inequity aversion (see Table 1 below). In both treatments, Person 2 is the decision maker 
(dictator) who can choose between allocations A, B, and C. Note that own choices never 
affect Person 2's payoff. Person 2 can redistribute income from the rich (Person 1) to the 
poor (Person 3) in both treatments by choosing allocations B or C instead of allocation A. 
However, choices B and C involve a relatively high efficiency loss. In treatment Ey, every 
additional money unit that is given to the poor person reduces the rich person’s income by 
4 money units, while the rich person suffers an income reduction of 3 units if the poor 
person’s income is increased by one unit in treatment P. Treatment P is particularly 
important because the decision maker (Person 2) always earns the lowest income and the 
various choices cannot change this. Thus, Rawlsian preferences play no role at all here. 
Therefore, treatment P constitutes a clean test of the relevance of inequity aversion in 
comparison to the efficiency motive. Moreover, a choice of the efficient allocation A in 
treatment P not only constitutes evidence against specific functional form assumptions 
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(like piece-wise linearity or positional asymmetry, meaning that subjects prefer 
advantageous inequity to disadvantageous inequity) in the Fehr-Schmidt approach, but also 
against general non-linear versions of inequity aversion as developed by Neilson (2002).4  
We received a first inkling that subject pool effects might have influenced the E&S 
results when we tried to replicate them with a group of academics (aged 30 to 65) who 
were fellows at the Institute for Advanced Study in Berlin. Every year, this institute hosts 
roughly 50 scientists from all over the world, specialized in many different disciplines 
including biology, neuroscience, zoology, the social sciences, and the humanities. Only 
one economist was in this subject pool. We solicited unpaid, anonymous responses from 
45 scientists in treatments Ey and P. The anonymity requirement ensured that the 
experimenter could not identify the subjects’ individual choices. In sharp contrast to the 
E&S results, a large majority (69%) of the scientists were willing to redistribute income 
from the rich to the poor in the Ey treatment, even though this involved a high efficiency 
loss. Only 22% preferred the efficient yet inequitable allocation A. Treatment P revealed a 
similar pattern, where only 20% of the subjects favored the efficient allocation A, whereas 
60% chose the allocation predicted by inequity aversion. These results from a sample of 
scientists from non-economic disciplines led us to examine the subject pool issue in more 
depth.  
We examined the subject pool hypothesis more rigorously by eliciting responses 
from two different subject pools from the University of Munich5 in a first wave of paid 
experiments. The first subject pool consisted of 109 first year undergraduate students in 
economics and business administration (henceforth called “economists”), while the second 
subject pool was made up of 83 first and second year undergraduates from other 
disciplines, mostly the social sciences (henceforth called “non-economists”). The subjects 
had to make a decision in both of the distribution games discussed above. The results of 
these experiments are reported in Table 1. For convenience, we also show the results from 
the E&S experiments in panel (A) of this table.  
                                                 
4 The inequity aversion approach by Fehr and Schmidt is fully compatible with the evidence in many of the 
other games E&S conducted (in particular, in their envy games) if one allows for non-linear forms of inequity 
aversion and gives up the positional asymmetry assumption. 
5 In all experiments reported in this paper, subjects made their decisions anonymously, they were paid in 
private, and there was no role uncertainty, i.e., the decision makers knew that they were in the role of person 
2.  
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TABLE 1 – SUBJECT POOL EFFECTS: ECONOMISTS VERSUS NON-ECONOMISTS 
   Treatment Ey Treatment P   
 Allocation A B C A B C 
 Person 1 Payoff 21 17 13 14 11 8 
 Person 2 Payoff 9 9 9 4 4 4 
 Person 3 Payoff 3 4 5 5 6 7 
 Total Payoff 33 30 27 23 21 19 
 Average Payoff  of 1 and 3 12 10.5 9 9.5 8.5 7.5 
 Efficiency prediction A    A    
 Inequity aversion prediction (BO & FS)    C    C 
 Rawlsian maximin prediction    C A or B or C 
 Engelmann & Strobel results 
Economists: Humboldt Univ. Berlin 
      
(A) Choices (absolut) 12 7 11 18 2 10 
 Choices (percent) 40 23.3 36.7 60 6.7 33.3 
 Economists: University of Munich           
(B) Choices (absolut) 72 12 25 63 16 30 
 Choices (percent) 66.1 11 22.9 57.8 14.7 27.5 
 Non-Economists: University of Munich           
(C) Choices (absolut) 22 13 48 21 17 45 
 Choices (percent) 26.5 15.7 57.8 25.3 20.5 54.2 
 Non-Economists: Zurich, Switzerland       
(D) Choices (absolut)    8 8 20 
 Choices (percent)    22.2 22.2 55.6 
 Economists: Zurich, Switzerland           
(E) Choices (absolut) 31 9 18 31 9 18 
 Choices (percent) 53.5 15.5 31 53.5 15.5 31 
 Non-Economists: Zurich, Switzerland       
(F) Choices (absolut) 61 23 78 53 25 84 
 Choices (percent) 37.7 14.2 48.1 32.7 15.4 51.9 
 
The subject pool effects displayed in Table 1 are striking. The Munich economics 
and business administration students corroborate the main E&S result, confirming that 
preferences for efficiency play a major role among economists (compare panels A and B of 
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Table 1). 66.1% of the economists opted for the efficient but most inegalitarian allocation 
A in treatment Ey, even exceeding the 40% in the E&S study. The efficiency advantage of 
allocation A is somewhat lower in game P, and the fraction of economists opting for the 
efficient allocation A decreases slightly to 57.8%, very similar to the E&S results. The 
behavior of non-economists from the University of Munich contrasts sharply with these 
results, however (see panel C of Table 1). In games Ey and P, the non-economists chose 
the inefficient allocation C as predicted by inequity aversion at the rate of 57.8% and 
54.2%, respectively, while only 25-27% opted for the efficient allocation A. The 
differences between the non-economists and the economists from the University of Munich 
are statistically highly significant, both in treatment Ey and treatment P (p < 0.001 in each 
treatment, Fisher exact test).  
An additional paid experiment with non-economists (college students) in Zurich, 
Switzerland, who only participated in treatment P, further confirms the robustness of the 
subject pool effect. A comparison of panels C and D of Table 1 shows that these students' 
choices were almost identical to those of the non-economists from the University of 
Munich (p > 0.93, Fisher exact test). Only 22% choose the efficient allocation A, while 
55.6% choose the allocation predicted by inequity aversion. The choices of the non-
economists in Munich and Zurich also differ significantly from the choices of the E&S 
subjects (p < 0.001, Fisher exact test), further supporting a strong subject pool effect.  
Since the available allocations are ordered from “most efficient and least egalitarian” 
(i.e. allocation A) to “least efficient and most egalitarian” (i.e. allocation C), it is also 
possible to conduct a statistical analysis on the basis of ordered probit regressions. The 
dependent variable takes on the value 0 if allocation A is chosen, the value 1 if B is chosen, 
and the value 2 if allocation C is chosen. We estimated the marginal effect of a dummy 
variable for economists on the probability of choosing the “least efficient and most 
egalitarian” allocation C. This dummy is highly significant (p < 0.001) and negative in 
both games, indicating that the probability of an economist choosing C is 0.30 smaller in 
treatment Ey and 0.33 less in treatment P, when compared with the probabilities for non-
economists6. 
 
                                                 
6 Among non-economists, the baseline probability for choosing allocation C is 0.57 in treatment Ey and 0.58 
in treatment P. 
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II. The Impact of Political Attitudes and Gender on Social Preferences 
Are subjects’ social preferences related to their political opinions and to gender? One 
might conjecture that subjects with a more right wing political attitude are less in favor of 
equality and prefer the more efficient allocations. To assess the impact of political attitude 
on social preferences, we conducted additional experiments where – after subjects had 
made their choices in treatments Ey and P – we collected information about their political 
attitudes and how they voted in the last general election. We also collected information 
about their age, gender, and their membership in organizations (such as sports clubs or 
local charities). We recruited 68 third semester students of economics or business 
administration from the University of Zurich and 100 third semester students from other 
faculties (law and medicine) for these experiments and an additional 62 non-economists 
from outside the university. These last subjects were non-management employees of banks 
and other financial institutions. They had no academic education, but all of them had 
completed an apprenticeship for their current job.  
The subjects' political preferences were elicited in two ways. First, subjects ranked 
themselves on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates the most extreme left wing position 
and 10 indicates the most extreme right wing position. This self-report measure of political 
attitudes is now widely used in representative surveys in Switzerland. In addition, we 
asked subjects how they voted in the last national election. Both economists and non-
economists participated in these elections at a rate of approximately 70%. For these 
subjects, we computed a Spearman rank correlation between their self-reported political 
attitudes on the 0-10 scale and their votes for left, center, and right parties.7 This 
correlation is 0.78 (p < 0.001), indicating that subjects’ ranking on the left-right scale and 
their actual voting behavior are consistent.  
The results of our new experiments are displayed in panels E and F of Table 1 and in 
Table 2. We first tested for differences between students from non-economic disciplines 
and employees. It turns out that the behavior of these two groups is very similar, and 
confirmed by statistical tests (p = 0.775 in the Ey treatment, p = 0.739 in the P treatment, 
Fisher exact test). Therefore, we pooled their data in panel F of Table 1. The table shows 
that both in treatment Ey and P, 53.5% of the economists prefer the efficient allocation A 
whereas only 31% preferred the egalitarian allocation C (see panel E of the table). 
                                                 
7 In these calculations, we treat the social democrats and the green party as left-wing parties, the liberal party 
(FDP), the Christian democrats (CVP) and the European people’s party (EVP) are center parties, and the 
Swiss people’s party (SVP) is a right wing party. This classification is also used by political scientists.  
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However, this pattern is reversed among the non-economists (panel F of Table 1). A 
majority of non-economists (51.9%) prefers the most egalitarian allocation C and only 
32.7% choose the efficient allocation A in treatment P. Similarly, a relative majority of the 
non-economists (48.1%) prefer allocation C in treatment Ey and only 37.7% choose the 
efficient allocation A.  
These differences in social preferences are associated with small but insignificant 
differences in self-reported political attitudes (p = 0.41, Mann Whitney test). On average, 
economists score 5.28 on the left-right scale, whereas the non-economists are somewhat 
more left wing and score 4.95. These average numbers hide, however, strong individual 
variation both within the group of economists as well as in the group of non-economists. It 
is therefore interesting to examine whether individual differences in political attitude can 
explain the individual variation in social preferences across subjects.  
In Table 2, we report the marginal effects of ordered probit regressions where the 
choice of the most unequal allocation A is represented with 0, allocation B with 1, and the 
egalitarian allocation C with 2. As explanatory variables, we included a dummy variable 
for economists (1 for economist), a gender dummy (1 for women), the political attitude on 
the left-right scale, age, and a dummy for whether the subject is a member in an 
organization or club.8 Regression (1) is based on data from the Ey treatment and regression 
(2) uses the data from the P treatment. We pool the data from both treatments in regression 
(3) and control for the dependance of subjects’ decisions across treatments by clustering on 
subjects. We also control for a treatment effect in regression (3) by including a dummy for 
the Ey treatment.  
The most important fact stemming from the first three regressions reported in Table 2 
is that the marginal effect for the economists’ dummy is negative and highly significant 
even after controlling for political attitudes. In fact, while political attitude has virtually no 
effect on social preferences, regression (3) shows economists to have an 18 percentage 
point lower probability of choosing the egalitarian allocation C. Age, membership in 
organizations, and the Ey-dummy have no significant effects. The gender variable is 
weakly significant, however, and indicates that women are more egalitarian. If we average 
over both treatments (i.e. take regression 3), women are roughly 10 percent more likely to 
choose the egalitarian allocation C.  
                                                 
8 We conjectured that subjects who are club members might be more egalitarian. It makes no difference 
whether we include the dummy or the number of club memberships.  
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TABLE 2 – IMPACT OF SUBJECT POOL, POLITICAL ATTITUDE AND GENDER 
 
Dependent variable: choices in the distribution game 
(0=allocation A, 1=allocation B, 2=allocation C) 
 
New data 
(panel E and F in Table 1) 
 All data  
(panels B-F in Table 1) 
 
Independent variables 
(1) 
Ey 
(2) 
P 
(3) 
Ey&P 
 (4) 
Ey 
(5) 
P 
(6) 
Ey&P 
Dummy for economist 
(1 = economist) 
 
-0.158** 
(0.069) 
-0.198*** 
(0.069) 
-0.177*** 
(0.060) 
 -0.258*** 
(0.043) 
-0.242*** 
(0.043) 
-0.246*** 
(0.038) 
Gender dummy  
(1 = women) 
 
0.066 
(0.066) 
0.125* 
(0.066) 
0.095* 
(0.058) 
 0.091* 
(0.048) 
0.086* 
(0.045) 
0.101** 
(0.040) 
Political attitude  
(0=left, 10=right) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
    
Age  
 
0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
    
Dummy for membership in
organizations 
0.073 
(0.068) 
0.108 
(0.069) 
0.090 
(0.059) 
    
Dummy for Ey-treatment 
 
  -0.035 
(0.034) 
   -0.037 
(0.025) 
Pr (C) if a non-economist 0.518 0.482 0.500  0.530 0.513 0.518 
Number of observations 216 216 432  443 407 850 
Cluster per Subjects no no yes  no no yes 
Prob > chi2 0.0072 0.1035 0.0068  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0362 0.0211 0.0278  0.0391 0.0468 0.0442 
 
Note: The table reports the marginal effects of the different variables on choosing 
the egalitarian allocation C. Numbers in parentheses denote the standard error of 
the marginal effects. The marginal effects are evaluated at the point where the 
dummy for economists is set at zero. The estimated baseline probability of 
choosing allocation C for non-economists is given in the row “Pr(C) if being a non-
economist”. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from 
zero above the 0.1, 0.05 and the 0.01 significance levels, respectively. 
 10
We pooled all data from our experiments in regressions 4 – 6 to estimate the overall 
impact of the economists’ dummy and a gender dummy on social preferences9. The results 
of these regressions indicate that economists are approximately 25 percentage points less 
likely to choose the egalitarian allocation C, while women are more likely to choose C by 
roughly 10 percentage points. Note also that if we pool the data from both treatments 
(regression 6) the gender dummy is significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
III. Social Preferences in Strategic Contexts 
The E&S experiments all involve dictator games without strategic interaction. This raises 
the question whether concerns for efficiency play a role in strategic games. A large amount 
of evidence suggests that other concerns dominate the efficiency motive in strategic games. 
The ultimatum game illustrates this phenomenon clearly. Efficiency would imply that the 
responder should accept any positive offer; however, overwhelming evidence shows that 
low offers are often rejected, suggesting that efficiency seeking is of little importance in 
the ultimatum game. Similarly, efficiency in (typical) linear public good experiments 
would require that players contribute their entire endowments to the public good. While 
some subjects contribute significant amounts in the first rounds of these experiments, the 
level of cooperation frequently declines over time. A large majority of subjects contributes 
very little or free rides completely in the final round. This evidence suggests that negative 
reciprocity – triggered by unfair offers or by the free riding of other group members – 
dominates efficiency concerns.10  
We hypothesize that there is a fundamental discontinuity between social preferences 
in non-strategic and in strategic games. We define a strategic game as one where at least 
two players can affect each others' payoffs by their actions and there are (partial) conflicts 
of interest. Therefore, the players tend to see each other as opponents. Only one player 
makes a decision in a non-strategic dictator game, however, so there is no rivalry and a 
more charitable frame of mind is triggered. Self-centered notions of fairness are likely to 
                                                 
9 We took all data reported in panels B – F in Table 1. Since we do not have values for age, political attitude 
and membership in organizations in the experiments reported in panels B – D we cannot use these variables 
in the regressions 4 – 6.  
10 Positive reciprocity or inequity aversion also dominates the efficiency motive in gift exchange games. In 
many gift exchange experiments, the employer’s payoff is given by πe = (v – w)e and the worker’s payoff is 
given by πw = w – c(e). v > 0 is a constant, e denotes the effort level, w the wage level and c(e) the effort 
cost. These payoff functions imply that any increase in profit due to increasing effort declines as w rises. 
Thus, the marginal efficiency gains from an effort increase are smaller at higher wages, implying a negative 
relation between effort and wages if workers care for efficiency. However, the stylized fact is that effort 
varies positively with wages in the gift exchange game.  
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be more salient if a decision maker views the other player as an opponent, while the notion 
of helping the group or helping the poor is likely to be more salient if all the other players 
are at the decision maker’s mercy. If this conjecture is true, any attempt to generalize 
social preferences from a non-strategic to a strategic context is problematic. 
Several pieces of evidence support our conjecture. In an earlier version of this paper 
(Fehr and Schmidt 2003b), we reported the results of an experiment in which economists 
participated in an ultimatum game prior to playing treatments Ey and P. We conjectured 
that the saliency of self-centered fairness in the ultimatum game will spill over to the 
subsequent dictator game, rendering the efficiency motive less important. This is indeed 
what we observed: the choice of the efficient allocation A in game Ey decreased 
significantly by 25 percentage points if the subjects played the ultimatum game prior to the 
dictator game and the choice of allocation A decreased by 15 percentage points in game P.  
There is also evidence suggesting that the Rawlsian preference to help the worst off 
in the group does not play a significant role in strategic games. Güth and van Damme 
(1998) conducted a three-person experiment combining an ultimatum and a dictator game: 
at stage 1, player one has to make a proposal (x,y,z) on how to allocate a given sum of 
money between himself and players two and three. Player 2 then decides whether to accept 
or reject the proposal. If he accepts, the proposal is implemented, otherwise all players earn 
zero. Player 3 remains inactive and cannot affect the final outcome. Güth and van Damme 
report that the proposer (player 1) allocates only marginal amounts to the dummy (player 
3). Player 2 also does not seem to care about player 3. Even though some of the proposals 
are rejected, not a single rejection can be attributed to an unfair share offered to player 3. 
These observations contradict maximin preferences, while they are consistent with models 
of inequity aversion (see Fehr and Schmidt 2003a).11  
 
IV. Conclusions 
Recent evidence by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) seems to suggest that preferences for 
efficiency and for the welfare of the least well off are quantitatively more important than 
                                                 
11 Frechette, Kagel, and Lehrer (2003) provide another striking example of the neglect of weak players' 
interests in strategic interactions. In their experiments, one player in a group of five can make a proposal of 
how to allocate a fixed sum of money among the group. Then the players vote on the proposal using majority 
rule, i.e., the support of 3 players is sufficient for the implementation of the proposal. In 65% of the cases, the 
proposals offered a zero payoff for two of the five players, completely neglecting the interests of members 
outside the winning coalition. Moreover, these proposals received the support of the majority in most cases. 
Thus, Rawlsian preferences seem to play a limited role in this environment.  
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inequity aversion in dictator games. However, the subject pool in their experiments 
consists exclusively of economists. Here we have shown that the dominance of the 
efficiency motive over the equity motive is limited to economists, whereas various groups 
of non-economists – ranging from academic researchers to students of many other 
disciplines to non-academic employees of banks and financial institutions – show the 
opposite pattern. On average, more than 50% of the non-economists prefer the most 
inefficient and most egalitarian distribution among the available payoff allocations; the 
probability of an economist choosing this allocation is 25 percentage points lower than that 
of a non-economist. We have also shown that subjects' political preferences do not affect 
their social preferences for efficiency and equity. Subjects with a right wing political 
attitude are as likely to choose the egalitarian allocation as left wing subjects. Women, 
however, favor the egalitarian allocation more than men do.   
Based on our experiments, we conclude that preferences for equity are important in 
non-strategic dictator games. Furthermore, we argue that concerns for efficiency (and 
Rawlsian motives) play only a minor role in many strategic games. However, the exact 
effect of the strategic nature of a game on the subjects' preferences is still an open question 
that has to be addressed in future research.  
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